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The dermition of an acceptable risk involves many facets most of which are outside the control of the
decision maker, but they must be recognized if a proper dermition is to be made. Six of the principal
factors are stated and discussed. (1) nothing is absolutely safe; (2) each individual or group ofindividuals
has his own standards by which hejudges risk; (3) perceptions ofrisk vary with the conditions at any one
time in history; (4) there must be a compensatory benefit for taking any risk; (5) societal perception of a
risk may be different from the actual risk; and (6) safety is only one of the many factors that must be
considered in the design of a product or service.
The question of what is hazardous and what is
safe may appear to be anomalous to some, because
it is superficially apparent that an item that is
hazardous is not safe and vice versa. However, this
is one of the more important and controversial
questions in the United States today. Decisions are
being made, on some matters, that could lead to
potential risk to members of the population. Con-
versely, decisions are also being made to ban some
product or process because the risks are too great.
How are such decisions made? What is a rational
basis for them? I do not propose to provide answers
to these questions because the problem is extremely
complex and, in fact, is probably insoluble by the
normal scientific or technical ways ofviewing real-
ity. Instead, I will present some thoughts that may
be ofuse in betterunderstanding the problem and in
implementing approaches to its solution.
This question is particularly appropriate to the
subject of this symposium because we must con-
sider what we mean by hazardous before we can
decide on treatment or disposal of "hazardous"
solid waste. An error could lead to a waste of re-
sources if a relatively innocuous material is treated
as hazardous; alternatively, it could result in harm
to people or the environment by allowing in-
adequate treatment and disposal of a harmful ma-
terial.
There are several principles that I feel to be of
importance in assessing the rationale for present
practice and that must be included in the thinking of
those who make decisions that are primarily of a
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societal nature: (1) nothing is absolutely safe; (2)
each individual or group of individuals has his own
standards by which hejudges risks; (3) perceptions
of risk vary with the conditions at any one time in
history; (4) there must be a compensatory benefit
for taking any risk; (5) societal perception of a risk
may be different from the actual risk; (6) safety is
only one of the many factors that must be consid-
ered in the design of a product or service.
It will be noted at the outset that the major bases
for these principles result from people and the way
that they think and act rather than from the detailed
technical analysis and knowledge of the scientist.
This, perhaps, explains the frustration of the scien-
tist or the engineer who "proves" that a risk is low
and acceptable by a detailed analysis only to find
that he cannot gain acceptance by the public. In the
following, we will discuss some observations on
each of these principles.
The first, that nothing is absolutely safe, is a
truism that derives from the fact that man is mortal,
and, in addition to the effects of disease and aging,
can be killed or injured by a number ofactivities in
which he engages. This is well illustrated by the
vital statistics of this, or any other country, which
show illness and death in all age categories. While
we regard this principle as a truism, we must also
recognize that people do not like to have either
themselves or their families and friends harmed, so
that any risk from our activities must be held to a
level low enough to meet the expectations of the
public. This is defined in many quarters as an "ac-
ceptable" risk. It is not, however, appropriate for
the public to ask for a risk ofabsolutely zero while
at the same time obtaining the benefits ofa product
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ciple. Thus, the first hurdle in defining a safe prod-
uct is in assessing the level of risk that may occur
and the reaction of the public to this risk as well as
to the value that they may place on the benefits
brought by the action.
The second principle, that people differ in the
way that theyjudge risks, has been codified in deci-
sion theory which uses this principle as the basis for
further derivations. In this theory it is noted that
individuals have different ways of looking at risk
and that the attitude of an individual can be rep-
resented by utility curves or curves that plot the
willingness of an individual to risk various out-
comes for which a probability of both losing and
winning are present. These curves are as widely
different for different individuals in their willingness
to take risk or their aversion to risk as are the other
characteristics of individuals. The corresponding
curve for that nebulous entity that we call society or
the public is the total or weighted average ofeach of
the individuals in the society. I say weighted aver-
age because there are people who are more influen-
tial in arriving at the societal curve than others. For
example, there are now very vocal groups who in-
fluence the public perception of risk. Interestingly
enough, these people frequently concentrate on one
source of risk and demonstrate great risk aversion
to this source, meanwhile ignoring much greater
risks that could be reduced at a much lower cost
than the one of concern. Thus, individuals and
groups may have different utility curves for differ-
ent sources ofrisk, resulting in even greater overall
social disparity in the perception. However, no one
has ever stated that human affairs are conducted by
logic alone, nor would I necessarily recommend
that logic be the major touchstone.
The third principle, that perceptions of risk vary
with the conditions at the time, has been discussed
by Lowrance (1). Essentially it means that the de-
gree ofrisk aversion depends upon the risks existing
at the time as well as upon the current amenities of
life. To illustrate the principle, let us consider a
hypothetical situation in which the only way that an
individual could be harmed would be by one
specific type of activity. Otherwise the life span
would be, for all practical purposes, infinite. In this
case, we can predict that most people would have a
high degree ofaversion to this particular risk. On a
less hypothetical basis, primitive man lived with
serious risks ofall kinds: disease, animals, and even
other men. Death and injury were common experi-
ences and were accepted with some degree of
fatalism because control of such risks required the
development of technology and institutions far be-
yond his comprehension. Within living memory,
diseases such as diphtheria, typhoid fever, and
pneumonia took a fearsome toll. These all affected
the way that people regarded risks and their conse-
quences.
From this, one can conclude that the control of
one risk will result in increased importance of
another in the public mind. Thus we foresee a con-
tinually changing spectrum ofrisks with a new one,
usually oflesser intensity, replacing each one that is
controlled. However, the fact of lesser intensity
does not mean that public concern is lessened be-
cause the next risk becomes important in the overall
spectrum of risks existing at the time and the ex-
pectations ofthe public have been increased by the
elimination of the earlier risk. This means that as
our ability to control risks increases, we can expect
to be held to even higher standards in all phases of
our activities. This may be a discouraging prospect
for many technologists who feel that current desires
in many areas are already close to unattainable, but
it is a trend that must be taken into account in plan-
ning for the future.
The fourth principle, that a benefit should accrue
for taking a risk, can be observed in practice in the
actions ofpeople. For example, individuals do take
high-risk jobs because the pay is worth the risk to
them and, presumably, because they enjoy the
prestige associated with the work. In leisure activ-
ities, some people gain the benefit of enjoyment
from mountain climbing, skiing, and swimming al-
though the record clearly shows that people en-
gaged in these activities are hurt and killed every
year. Obviously these people see benefit in such
activities or they would not expose themselves to
the added risk. Perhaps the classic example is the
use of the automobile in our society. In addition to
the injuries and deaths, the degradation of the air
quality over our cities poses a significant risk. Yet
the benefits of convenient and personalized trans-
portation appear to outweigh, in the minds of most
people, these very obvious risks.
The above are illustrations of what have been
termed "'voluntary" risks. In this class of risk, the
added risk is accepted voluntarily and the conse-
quences are, for the most part, to the individual
participating. This is not completely true, since
there are risks to others such as pedestrians, the
team that must rescue the downed flier or fallen
mountain climber, or the public from the air de-
graded by the automobile. However, these are
rarely considered by the individual deciding to par-
ticipate. Starr (2) has noted that we appearto accept
a voluntary risk that is much higher than one that is
imposed upon us by others.
An involuntary risk is one over which we have
little or no direct control. Such manifestations of
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are frequently quoted as examples. Others are the
effluents from factories or other effects of our
technology. In theory, a person living in an area
where such risks occur can avoid them by moving
to an area where they do not occur or are less prev-
alent. However, in moving, one may simply sub-
stitute one type ofrisk for another. In addition, we
are frequently so trapped by the forces ofour soci-
ety, such as lack ofmeans to move, orthe necessity
ofworking at ajob in one particular area, that such
a method of avoidance is actually impossible. It is
also ofinterest that such societal "traps" can result
in a voluntary risk becoming an involuntary risk.
For example, the automobile, frequently quoted as
a prime example of the voluntary risk, has so
shaped our choice ofplaces ofliving and our trans-
portation system that in many cases we must use it,
and take the consequent risk, to get to ourjobs or
even to the stores for food or clothing.
The potential exposure to risks as a result of our
technology is real and has been ofconcern to many
people. In recent years, the practice of banning
products that show no benefit to the user, even if
the risks are low, is aprime application ofourfourth
principle. The exposure to effluents from the in-
dustrial activity ofthe country is frequently quoted
as an involuntary risk and as an injust imposition of
risk on those people exposed with the benefits ac-
cruing to the few-presumably those who make
money out ofthe enterprise. I would suggest, how-
ever, that in our closely interconnected society, it is
impossible to completely divorce oneself from his
neighbor and his neighbor's activities. We are all
interdependent for our food, clothing, energy, and
even entertainment. How many people would sur-
vive ifthis enormous network were to disappearand
we were left to our own resources to furnish the
necessities of life? The answer, while not quantita-
tive, is clear-very few! If you don't believe it, try
raising enough fruits, vegetables and animals to feed
yourself and your family in a typical city dwelling!
Thus, rather than taking a narrow view that such
activities impose an involuntary risk to the many
while the few get the benefits, we must consider the
benefits from the various activities to be to us as
members of society and weigh the risks against the
benefits to us in this role. Remember that our activ-
ities also impose a risk on others. The important
question is not the imposition ofrisk at low levels,
but rather, whether the product or service furnished
by this activity produces benefits that outweigh the
risk.
I cannot leave this principle without a few words
about the cost-benefit analyses currently so popular
in attempting to arrive at a decision. Such studies
are useful for broadening the perspectives and
knowledge of the individual doing the study. They
are not without some danger, however. It is a
popular belief that scientists are intimately familiar
with all details of the potential impacts of a given
technology. However, when we come to the point,
we usually find that the situation is so complex that
it is impossible to describe the impacts fully, and
many assumptions are necessary to arrive at the
final answer. Thus, two people can use the same
basic information and arrive at two different bal-
ances depending upon their viewpoints. The ten-
dency to "quantify the unquantifiable" so that the
decision drops into the decision-maker's lap with-
out the agony of preparing oneself and taking the
necessary action is hard to resist. It is for these
reasons that I feel that such studies should be used
primarily as inputs to a decision made by knowl-
edgeable and experienced people with the freedom
to disagree with the conclusions of the analysis if
theirjudgement tells them that the conclusions are
wrong. I would also recommend that decisions
should, whenever possible, be made only after a
detailed and documented review ofall the facts that
are available. This not only assures that the facts
have been considered, but it also allows others to
understand the basis for the decision so that future
changes can take the detailed basis into account.
The fifth principle, that the perception of a risk
may be different from the actual risk, is one that
frequently results in frustration for those who are
engaged in an endeavor which they are convinced is
safe and useful but which results in opposition from
the public, ormore correctly, from some segment of
the public. There are two types of people who are
involved in this principle. The first consists ofthose
who use the risk argument to oppose an action that
they disapprove of for other reasons and who see
the risk argument as one that will persuade other
people to oppose the action also. For example,
there are those who feel that technology has gone
too far and that we should all resort to a "simpler
existence." These people are therefore obliged to
fight any new advance with the presumed hope that
failure ofthis proposal will, at least, prevent further
encroachment on their desires and may be a first
step toward retrenchment in other areas. It is un-
fortunate that this group of people is not really
willing to discuss their real desires because it is pos-
sible that there could be some agreement with their
thoughts. However, discussions on risk and bene-
fits are useless for these people because their deci-
sion was made on other grounds.
The second type ofperson is one who is sincerely
concerned about the potential risks and is unwilling
to trust those in authority (either in government or
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take proper precautions. As an aside, it is my opin-
ion that we have become all too willing to mistrust
the motives ofthose who advocate some action and
who are the ones with the knowledge to take appro-
priate action. It is often proposed that the objec-
tions of this group ofpeople can be overcome by a
"'public relations compaign." However, such cam-
paigns too often become sales gimmicks designed to
tout the safety and validity ofthe technology rather
than a sincere effort to provide the people with facts
and a candid discussion of the problems. It is my
opinion that this problem can only be overcome by
conducting our business in such a way that the
decisions being made are in the good interests of
both the public and the industry. While short-range
gains may be made by taking short cuts on a self-
interest basis, the long-range loss in confidence, not
only of those taking the short cut, but also in the
entire establishment, will more than nullify these
short-term gains. It is noted that the requirements
for open meetings in the government were designed
to assure that decisions were made in an open man-
ner to protect the interests ofall involved. While the
motive, and frequently the execution, is praise-
worthy, there are some difficulties because any at-
tempt to explore the issues involved fully can raise
questions that are not resolved; when these ques-
tions are sensationalized, added prejudice against
the project can result.
The last principle essentially states that the safety
ofan endeavor cannot be isolated fromotherfactors
such as workability, resource cost, economics, and
benefits. Safety or the degree of freedom from risk
is as much an attribute ofthe endeavor as any ofits
other features and frequently results from trade-offs
with these other attributes. In the initial stages of
any project, decisions must be made as to whether
adequate safety can be obtained at a cost that will
enable the benefits to the user to outweigh this cost.
When this balance cannot be achieved the action
should not be taken. For projects where the risks
are within bounds, safety becomes one of the
specific design questions. In past years, the
tradeoffs between workability, costs, and other
features with safety were made by engineers with
their main guidance being feedback from the market
place (which, in this case, includes legal suits for
nonperformance or accidents).
In recent years, the regulatory process has inter-
vened to prescribe mandatory actions to obtain
safety. This serves to assure that some interest
other than that of the advocate is involved in the
decisions. However, it is far from clear that the reg-
ulators can provide proper trade-offs because their
chartered interest is only in the safety of low risk
aspects ofthe project. Since they operate in a polit-
ical atmosphere, their natural tendency is to keep
risks as low as possible without regard to these
other factors. Obviously if an accident occurs or a
risk develops, they are called to account. Ofcourse,
in a political arena some counterpressures can be
brought to bear, but these are frequently not effec-
tive. As a result, we cannot be certain that optimal
balances between safety and costs or resource allo-
cations are being achieved.
Now we must ask ourselves what these principles
mean to our disposal ofhazardous waste. Such dis-
posal is an activity that must be carried out not only
by industry but also by government at all levels.
The costs will be borne by the public, indirectly in
higher costs of products or unavailability of prod-
ucts or services from industry if the disposal costs
are too high, or directly in taxes if a government
operation is involved. It is, therefore, ofimportance
to each citizen to see that optimal balances are
struck between the requirements to reduce the
hazard and the risks that are finally permitted.
While no formula has been devised or proposed to
apply these principles to decision making, some
awareness ofthem should enable those responsible,
both in government and in industry, better to con-
sider and take action on the legitimate interests of
the public even if such interests are not always
clearly articulated. This poses many problems in
view of the wide differences in viewpoints toward
individual sources of risk, and it is not clear as to
how these viewpoints should be balanced against
those of the expert. Suffice it to say that we are
apparently rewriting the Golden Rule to: "Do not
unto me as you would have me do unto you; rather
do unto me as you thinkthat I would be done unto."
I would be remiss in a symposium on hazardous
wastes if I did not mention the question of risk to
future generations. This question has been raised
repeatedly in the problems of nuclear waste dis-
posal and undoubtedly will be raised for other
hazardous wastes (particularly when they are
labeled as "hazardous"). It is a perplexing ques-
tion, particularly because of our inconsistency in
our attitudes toward this question and others that
affect the future. For example, we are depleting the
resources ofthe earth in minerals as well as energy.
The growing deserts in may parts ofthe world illus-
trate our disregard for the most important resource
ofall, our soils. At the same time, we tend to resist
the introduction of new technologies that could, to
some degree, alleviate some of these future prob-
lems. The basic questions that we must answer are
how much we should spend and what activities we
must forego because of a potential risk in the far
distant future. At the same time we must consider
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risk to ourselves, to assure that there will be people
with a civilization far enough advanced to ap-
preciate the freedom from risk. While it is tempting
for the people of this country to assume that the
United States has resources great enough to ac-
complish any task that it desires with no sacrifice to
them, recent events indicate that there are limita-
tions that must be respected ifwe are to continue as
agreat nation. I would suggest that anational policy
on this question offuture risk is needed so that the
engineers who must design the facilities have guid-
ance as to the goals and the need tojustify bases for
the future risk for each facility can be eliminated.
Hopefully, such a policy would be developed fol-
lowing thorough study and discussion with mature
reflection on all viewpoints.
Work performed under the auspices of US ERDA.
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